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COMMENT
SILENCED CITIZENS: THE POST-GARCETTI
LANDSCAPE FOR PUBLIC SECTOR EMPLOYEES
WORKING IN NATIONAL SECURITY
I. INTRODUCTION
While serving on the Massachusetts Supreme Court, Justice
Holmes dismissed a writ of mandamus in a case involving the
right of police officers to invoke the First Amendment, noting that
"[t]he petitioner may have a constitutional right to talk politics,
but he has no constitutional right to be a policeman."1 This oft-
quoted statement accurately described the status of public em-
ployee free speech rights prior to the 1960s, when a series of Su-
preme Court cases concluded that public sector employees do not
give up their right to free speech upon entry into public service.2
When the Supreme Court heard the landmark case Pickering v.
Board of Education3 in 1968, its decision was merely the latest in
a series of decisions striking down the Holmesian approach to
public sector employee speech.4 The basic concept was to grant
public sector employees the speech protections offered to private
1. McAuliffe v. Mayor of New Bedford, 29 N.E. 517, 517 (Mass. 1892).
2. See, e.g., Keyishian v. Bd. of Regents, 385 U.S. 589, 602 (1967) ("There can be no
doubt of the legitimacy of New York's interest in protecting its education system from sub-
version. But even though the governmental purpose be legitimate and substantial, that
purpose cannot be pursued by means that broadly stifle fundamental personal liberties
when the end can be more narrowly achieved.'" (quoting Shelton v. Tucker, 364 U.S. 479,
488 (1960))); Garrity v. New Jersey, 385 U.S. 493, 500 (1967) ("[P]olicemen, like teachers
and lawyers, are not relegated to a watered-down version of constitutional rights.").
3. 391 U.S. 563 (1968).
4. Keyishian, 385 U.S. at 602 (stating that although a state has a legitimate interest,
it cannot stifle personal liberties); see, e.g., Garrity, 385 U.S. at 500 (stating that policemen
are entitled to constitutional rights).
UNIVERSITY OF RICHMOND LAW REVIEW
employees and citizens, while at the same time balancing the in-
terests of the government employer against the employee's right
to speak freely.5 With some modifications, most importantly Con-
nick v. Myers' in 1983, the Pickering test has stood as the public
sector employee speech test since 1968. 7
All of this changed in May 2006, when the Supreme Court de-
cided Garcetti v. Ceballos' and established new restrictions on the
speech of public sector employees.9 Although the Garcetti decision
affected all public sector employees, it especially harmed public
sector employees working for national security agencies. First,
Garcetti created a new requirement for employee speech: if the
speech is made pursuant to an official job duty, then the employee
speaks as an employee rather than as a citizen, and receives no
First Amendment protection. 10 Although this rule created a myr-
iad of problems for most public sector employees, it created addi-
tional problems for national security employees, whose employers
can always argue that part of their official job duty is protecting
the country's national security interests. That is, even if the par-
ticular employee's job is only marginally related to national secu-
rity, the employer could reasonably argue that the overall na-
tional security interest of the agency makes protecting that
interest an official duty of the employee. As a result, national se-
curity employees cannot speak about even ordinary official duties,
such as filling out forms, reporting budgeting mistakes, or any
other matter that the government can tie to a national security
interest, regardless of whether the employee speech is related to
an official job duty.
Second, the Garcetti decision used the existence of statutory
protections for employees, such as whistleblower acts, to justify
its removal of First Amendment protections. 1' Although Justice
Souter pointed out in his dissent that this option leaves many
5. See infra Part II.A.
6. 461 U.S. 138 (1983).
7. See infra Part II.A. Although some commentators and courts refer to the test as
the Connick test, most refer to it by its original name, the Pickering test, even though the
original test has been altered by Connick. This paper refers to the test as the Pickering
test.
8. 126 S. Ct. 1951 (2006).
9. See id. at 1959-62 (determining that an employee is not protected by the First
Amendment when speaking pursuant to his duties as a public officer).
10. See id. at 1960.
11. See id. at 1962.
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employees with an uncertain future, 12 national security employ-
ees in particular have extremely limited statutory protection if
they choose to speak out about legitimate problems within their
agencies." Thus, national security employees cannot depend on
First Amendment protections due to the government's ability to
assert national security as a job duty, and they can rarely, if ever,
turn to a federal whistleblower statute for protection because lit-
tle protection exists for most of the affected employees.' 4 National
security employees, then, are left exactly where Justice Holmes
began: with a constitutional right to speak about politics, but
without a constitutional right to keep their jobs.
Part II.A of this paper briefly outlines the Pickering balancing
test, with the Connick modifications, and Part II.B describes how
the Garcetti decision substantially changed the Pickering test.
Part III details how the Garcetti decision fails national security
employees in particular. Part III.A discusses the concept of "job
duty," and how altering the test to that of "essential job function"
might help some, but not all, national security employees. Part
III.B discusses the Whistleblower Protection Act of 1989 and its
impact on national security employees. Part III.C discusses the
Intelligence Community Whistleblower Protection Act of 1998,
and argues that even this attempt at protecting national security
employees left a great deal of gray area, necessitating the return
to the Pickering test. Part IV argues for a return to the tradi-
tional Pickering test, at least with respect to national security
employees.
12. See id. at 1971 (Souter, J., dissenting) (explaining that an employee will receive
different treatment under federal, state, and local laws).
13. See infra Parts III.B-C.
14. For the purposes of this paper, only the federal Whistleblower Protection Act of
1989, 5 U.S.C. §§ 1201-1222 (2000), and the Intelligence Community Whistleblower Pro-
tection Act of 1998, 5 U.S.C. app. § 8H (2000 & Supp. IV 2006), have been analyzed. There
may be other statutory recourse available to individual employees, such as the Military
Whistleblower Protection Act, 10 U.S.C. § 1034 (2000), for those working in the armed
forces. However, since these two statutes are the major federal statutes covering the af-
fected employees, these are the only two discussed.
20071
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II. PUBLIC SECTOR EMPLOYEES AND THE FREEDOM OF SPEECH
A. Pickering v. Board of Education: Creating a Balancing Test
In 1968 the Supreme Court decided a case in which a public
school teacher was fired for writing a letter to the newspaper
criticizing the local board of education's handling of tax increases
designed to raise new revenue for the school system. 5 The
teacher sued the board, claiming that the act of writing the letter
was protected by his First Amendment right to free speech.' 6 The
Supreme Court thus faced the issue of determining when an em-
ployee has First Amendment protection for addressing matters of
"public concern," stating, "The problem in any case is to arrive at
a balance between the interests of the teacher, as a citizen, in
commenting upon matters of public concern and the interest of
the State, as an employer, in promoting the efficiency of the pub-
lic services it performs through its employees."17 While the Court
did not offer a more precise definition for deciding what speech
activities constitute matters of public concern, it found the
teacher's letter about the handling of the tax increase to be such a
matter. 18 On the opposite end of the test, the Court characterized
the employer's interests largely in terms of detriment to the em-
ployer: if the employer is relatively unharmed by the speech, the
employee's speech is entitled to First Amendment protection. 9
Thus, the Supreme Court in Pickering set out a relatively broad,
albeit underdeveloped, test for certain types of employee speech.
So long as the employee speaks about a matter of public concern,
and the speech is not detrimental to the interests of the employer,
the speech is protected. 20
The Court recognized the lack of definition in the Pickering
balancing test when it decided Connick v. Myers." In Connick,
Sheila Myers, an assistant district attorney, was fired after she
circulated a questionnaire around the office concerning matters
15. Pickering v. Bd. of Educ., 391 U.S. 563, 564 (1968).
16. See id. at 565.
17. Id. at 568.
18. See id. at 571-72 (discussing the importance of having teachers, who are informed
about the subject of fund allocation, speak out about the issue).
19. See id. at 572-73.
20. See id. at 572-74.
21. 461 U.S. 138 (1983).
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such as the office transfer policy, office morale, employee confi-
dence in supervisors, and whether her fellow attorneys felt pres-
sured to work on political campaigns. 22 When the case came be-
fore the Supreme Court on a First Amendment claim, the Court
first addressed whether Myers's speech was a matter of public
concern." The Court explained that this question should be de-
cided after considering "the content, form, and context of a given
statement."24 Examining the questionnaire using this analysis,
the Court held that only the question that asked if attorneys felt
pressured to work on political campaigns was a matter of public
concern." The remaining questions were deemed to be questions
regarding internal office policy, not matters of public concern.
2 6
Regarding the government interest side of the balancing test, the
Court acknowledged Pickering's detriment analysis by concluding
that Myers's actions disrupted the office. 27 However, the Court
added to the detriment/disruption analysis by considering the
"manner, time, and place" in which the disruption occurred.2" The
Court ultimately sided with the government, holding that Myers's
discharge did not violate her First Amendment rights because
only one question on the questionnaire was protected speech and
the office was substantially disrupted by her actions.29 Connick,
therefore, clarified the balancing test broadly set forth in
Pickering. While the test has been interpreted differently by the
22. See id. at 141. Myers circulated the questionnaire as a result of her unhappiness
over a pending job transfer. See id. at 140-41.
23. See id. at 146. It is important to note that speech by public sector employees is
only protected when they are speaking on matters of public concern. This is because
"[w]hen employee expression cannot be fairly considered as relating to any matter of po-
litical, social, or other concern to the community, government officials should enjoy wide
latitude in managing their offices, without intrusive oversight by the judiciary in the name
of the First Amendment." Id. Thus, an employee who repeatedly submits postings on an
internal office blog complaining about the cafeteria food can theoretically be fired if she
does not have a contract or a collective bargaining agreement protecting her from termina-
tion without just cause. Despite the employee's beliefs to the contrary, her concern about
the food is not a matter of public concern, and thus is never, under any analysis, protected
First Amendment speech.
24. See id. at 147-48.
25. See id. at 149.
26. See id. at 147-49.
27. See id. at 153.
28. See id. at 152-53.
29. See id. at 154.
2007]
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circuit courts and varies slightly in different situations, the basic
test has remained the same since 1983.30
B. Garcetti v. Ceballos: Altering the Pickering Landscape
The Pickering landscape changed significantly in 2006 when
the Supreme Court decided Garcetti v. Ceballos.31 Richard Cebal-
los worked as a deputy district attorney for the Los Angeles
County District Attorney's Office.32 In February 2000, a defense
attorney contacted Ceballos concerning a pending criminal case,
requesting that Ceballos review suspected inaccuracies in an affi-
davit used to obtain a critical search warrant.33 As such requests
were routine, Ceballos investigated the affidavit and discovered
that it did contain many misrepresentations.34 Ceballos discussed
his concerns with the deputy sheriff, and contacted his supervi-
sors when he did not receive an adequate response.35 In doing so,
he prepared two memoranda: one discussing his concerns and an-
other describing his phone conversation with the deputy sheriff.
36
Despite Ceballos's concerns about the affidavit, his superiors in
the district attorney's office continued the prosecution.37 Although
the defense called Ceballos to testify to the misrepresentations in
the affidavit, the trial court upheld the validity of the warrant.38
After this incident, Ceballos was reassigned from his position
as a calendar deputy to a trial deputy, transferred to another
courthouse, and denied a promotion.39 Alleging that these actions
were retaliatory in nature, Ceballos filed an employment griev-
30. Prior to Garcetti, federal courts pared Pickering and its progeny into a two-prong
test to decide employee free speech cases. See Robert C. Cloud, Public Employee Speech on
Matters Pursuant to Their Official Duties: Whistle While You Work?, 210 EDUC. L. REP.
855, 865 (2006). First, the First Amendment will only "protect[] public employees when
they speak as citizens on matters of public concern," and not when they speak on matters
of personal interest. Id. Second, "[g]overnment employers have the right and authority to
restrict employee speech that disrupts organizational efficiency and to discipline employ-
ees who violate the employer-employee relationship." Id.
31. 126 S. Ct. 1951 (2006).
32. Id. at 1955.
33. Id.
34. Id.
35. Id. The meeting with his supervisors "allegedly became heated." Id. at 1956.
36. See id. at 1955-56.
37. See id. at 1956.
38. See id.
39. See id.
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ance, but the grievance was denied." Finally, Ceballos filed suit
in the United States District Court for the Central District of
California, asserting a claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and alleging
that his employer violated the First and Fourteenth Amendments
by retaliating against him for the memo to his superiors. 41 The
district court granted the defendants' motion for summary judg-
ment, "[nioting that Ceballos wrote his memo pursuant to his
employment duties . . . [and] conclud[ing] he was not entitled to
First Amendment protection for the memo's contents."42 The
United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit reversed,
holding that "Ceballos's allegations of wrongdoing in the memo-
randum constitute protected speech under the First Amend-
ment."43 The court of appeals analyzed the case under the
Pickering test, holding that the memo alleging government mis-
conduct was clearly a matter of public concern, and that the de-
fendants "failed even to suggest disruption or inefficiency in the
workings of the District Attorney's Office" due to the memo.'
The Supreme Court reversed in a five-to-four decision. 45 Writ-
ing for the majority,46 Justice Kennedy noted that the "controlling
factor" in the case was that Ceballos's asserted expressions "were
made pursuant to his duties as a calendar deputy. ' 47 The major-
ity then held that "when public employees make statements pur-
suant to their official duties, the employees are not speaking as
citizens for First Amendment purposes, and the Constitution does
not insulate their communications from employer discipline."48 In
40. See id.
41. Id.
42. Id.
43. Ceballos v. Garcetti, 361 F.3d 1168, 1173 (9th Cir. 2004), rev'd, 126 S. Ct. 1951
(2006).
44. Id. at 1178-80.
45. This case has an interesting political background. It was originally heard when
Justice O'Connor was still on the Court, but had not yet been decided when Justice
O'Connor retired and Justice Alito took her place. See Martin A. Schwartz, Supreme Court
Narrows Public Employee Free Speech Protection, N.Y.L.J., July 21, 2006, at 3. The Court
ordered a second oral argument, causing some to speculate that the Justices may have
been evenly divided before Justice Alito was seated and therefore needed his vote to break
the tie. See id. (citing Linda Greenhouse, Some Whistle-Blowers Lose Free Speech Protec-
tion, N.Y. TIMES, May 31, 2006, at A16).
46. Justice Kennedy was joined by Chief Justice Roberts and Justices Scalia, Thomas,
and Alito. Garcetti, 126 S. Ct. at 1954.
47. Id. at 1959-60.
48. Id. at 1960. Judge O'Scannlain, concurring in the Ninth Circuit's judgment, may
have given the Supreme Court the idea behind its holding when he wrote, "when public
2007]
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creating this distinction between speech as a private citizen (pro-
tected) and speech as an employee pursuant to an official job duty
(not protected), Justice Kennedy added, "Restricting speech that
owes its existence to a public employee's professional responsibili-
ties does not infringe any liberties the employee might have en-
joyed as a private citizen. It simply reflects the exercise of em-
ployer control over what the employer itself has commissioned or
created."4 9 The majority rejected the Ninth Circuit's interpreta-
tion of the Pickering balancing test, stating that allowing employ-
ers to restrict speech solely tied to job duties does not conflict
with the First Amendment concept of allowing employees to
speak out about matters of public concern." If employers feared
that employees lacked an outlet for airing their grievances, the
majority assured them that they could craft internal policies and
procedures for handling such matters.51 The majority also re-
jected a concern raised in Justice Souter's dissent regarding the
suggestion that "employers can restrict employees' rights by cre-
ating excessively broad job descriptions."52 Finally, the majority
asserted that employees were not left without any options:
Exposing governmental inefficiency and misconduct is a matter of
considerable significance .... The dictates of sound judgment are re-
inforced by the powerful network of legislative enactments-such as
whistle-blower protection laws and labor codes-available to those
who.., expose wrongdoing.... These imperatives, as well as obliga-
tions arising from any other applicable constitutional provisions and
mandates of the criminal and civil laws, protect employees and pro-
vide checks on supervisors who would order unlawful or otherwise
inappropriate actions. 
53
Although the Pickering test has not been abolished as a result
of Garcetti, it is unclear what remains. Rather than first inquir-
employees speak in the course of carrying out their routine, required employment obliga-
tions, they have no personal interest in the content of that speech that gives rise to a First
Amendment right." Ceballos, 361 F.3d at 1189 (O'Scannlain, J., concurring).
49. Garcetti, 126 S. Ct. at 1960.
50. See id. at 1961.
51. See id.
52. Id. (citing id. at 1965 n.2 (Souter, J., dissenting)). A total of three dissenting opin-
ions were filed. Id. at 1954. Justices Stevens and Breyer each dissented separately, while
Justice Souter's dissenting opinion was joined by Justices Stevens and Ginsburg. Id. The
dissents of Justices Stevens and Breyer will not be discussed due to their brevity and in-
applicability to this article.
53. Id. at 1962. The majority also declined to decide "whether the analysis we conduct
today would apply in the same manner to a case involving speech related to scholarship or
teaching," leaving that problem for another day. Id.
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ing whether the speech was a matter of public concern, the Gar-
cetti Court asked as a threshold question whether the speaker
acted as a citizen or as an employee. 4 Under this view, "the pub-
lic employee speaks as a citizen only to the extent he engages in
speech that could be made by a member of the general polity, not
speech that flows out of his or her duties as a governmental
agent."55 If the employee's speech was pursuant to an official job
duty, he spoke as an employee, and not as a citizen. Only if the
employee spoke as a citizen would the Pickering test come back
into play; however, it is as yet unresolved what the lower courts
will make of this citizen/employee distinction.56 Nevertheless, the
Court has tightened its restrictions considerably on what sort of
speech public sector employees may make, thereby altering the
Pickering landscape dramatically. Although all public sector em-
ployees are substantially affected, national security employees
now have the least First Amendment protection as a direct result
of the Garcetti decision.
III. GARCETTI's IMPACT ON NATIONAL SECURITY EMPLOYEES
Although national security employees were never discussed in
the Garcetti decision, they will be harmed more than any other
type of government employee by the case. National security em-
ployees are employees of various federal agencies-the Central
Intelligence Agency ("CIA"), the National Security Agency
("NSA"), the Federal Bureau of Investigation ("FBI"), the De-
partment of Homeland Security ("DHS"), etc.-whose general job
function is to protect the national security of the United States. 7
54. See id. at 1960; see also Samuel Estreicher, Public Workers' Job-Related Speech:
First Amendment Guards Lifted, N.Y.L.J., July 17, 2006, at 4. "The Garcetti holding cre-
ates an important new gloss in deciding the threshold inquiry: whether the government
worker is speaking as a citizen on a matter of public concern .... [T]he Court emphasizes
whether the speaker is acting in the role of 'citizen.'" Id.
55. Estreicher, supra note 54, at 4.
56. Justice Souter's dissent criticized the majority for creating this arbitrary distinc-
tion between speech made pursuant to an official job duty and speech made as a citizen.
See Garcetti, 126 S. Ct. at 1964 (Souter, J., dissenting).
57. The vast majority of these agencies are part of the "intelligence community" cre-
ated by the National Security Act of 1974, 50 U.S.C. § 401a(4) (2000 & Supp. III 2005). It
is worth noting that, in today's modern era, the terms "intelligence" and "national secu-
rity" are used almost interchangeably throughout many of the statutes, agency definitions,
and literature on this subject. For example, the National Security Act has as one of its
definitional terms "intelligence related to the national security." 50 U.S.C § 401a(5) (2000).
"National security" is used in this paper as a broad, all-encompassing term, which includes
2007]
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The Garcetti decision failed these employees in two respects.
First, it failed them by making it extremely easy for the govern-
ment to argue that it is a job duty of these individuals to protect
national security, despite Justice Kennedy's assertion that over-
broad job descriptions will not become an issue.58 Second, the de-
cision failed national security employees who seek to address
government wrongdoing, because statutory protections available
to other employees are largely unavailable.59 As a result, national
security employees are no longer offered First Amendment pro-
tections that were formerly available to them under the Pickering
analysis, and cannot benefit from statutory protection because it
is either nonexistent or extremely weak.6" Therefore, an exception
to Garcetti must be created for national security employees by al-
lowing a return to the traditional Pickering analysis.
A. National Security as a Job Duty
1. Imputing National Security as a Job Duty
The Garcetti majority cast aside Justice Souter's suggestion
that employers could restrict employees' rights by creating overly
broad job descriptions, stating that job descriptions often differ
from actual job duties.61 Justice Souter nonetheless cautioned the
Court that he remained "pessimistic enough" to foresee a future
in which government employers will merely expand job descrip-
tions to include more official duties, thus excluding virtually all
forms of currently protected First Amendment speech. 62 He then
noted that, were this expansion of job descriptions to occur, the
litigation would evolve into a battle over whether the duties thus
described were actually performed by the employee instead of a
battle over whether the employer has a right to describe job du-
ties in a way that will severely curtail permissible speech.63
the intelligence community. As for the DHS, part of it falls under the "intelligence com-
munity" definition of 50 U.S.C. § 401a(4) (2000 & Supp. III 2005), and the rest of it falls
under the Homeland Security Act of 2002, 6 U.S.C §§ 101-103, 111-113 (Supp. IV 2006).
58. See Garcetti, 126 S. Ct. at 1961.
59. See infra Parts III.B-C.
60. See infra Parts III.B-C.
61. See Garcetti, 126 S. Ct. at 1961-62.
62. See id. at 1965 n.2 (Souter, J., dissenting).
63. See id. (Souter, J., dissenting).
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Does such a battle over job descriptions versus actual job duties
matter when it comes to national security employees? That is,
could an employee ever make a winning argument to a tribunal
that it is not an "official job duty" to serve and protect the coun-
try's national security interests? After all, this hypothetical em-
ployee would have already been fired, presumably for saying
something he or she should not have said. Setting aside for the
sake of argument any ulterior motive of the employer, such as
discriminatory intent, what other possible argument would the
employer have for firing the individual but to protect national se-
curity? That is the argument that the tribunal is most likely to
believe and to accept--especially given the rule in Garcetti that
an employer can fire an employee for speech made pursuant to an
official job duty.
A quick perusal of the mission statements, major responsibili-
ties, and purposes of most national security agencies reveals as a
core goal the protection of national security. For example, the
CIA's website asserts that the agency's function is "to assist the
Director of the Central Intelligence Agency in carrying out [his or
her] responsibilities."64  One of those responsibilities is to
"[p]erform[] such other functions and duties related to intelli-
gence affecting the national security as the President or the Di-
rector of National Intelligence may direct."65 The website goes on
to list the new intelligence initiatives the CIA has engaged in to
address the "changing global realities" that have "reordered the
national security agenda."66 The CIA is not the only agency to
prominently state its goal of protecting national security. The De-
fense Intelligence Agency, the FBI, the National Geospatial-
Intelligence Agency, and the NSA, for example, all address na-
tional security as a prominent goal in their mission statements.67
64. CIA, About the CIA, https://www.cia.gov/cia/information/info.html (last visited
Feb. 17, 2007).
65. Id.
66. Id.
67. The mission statement of the Defense Intelligence Agency is to "[p]rovide timely,
objective, and cogent military intelligence to warfighters, defense planners, and defense
and national security policymakers." Defense Intelligence Agency: Employment, http://
www.diajobs.us (last visited Feb. 17, 2007). The FBI declares that its mission is "[t]o pro-
tect and defend the United States against terrorist and foreign intelligence threats, to up-
hold and enforce the criminal laws of the United States, and to provide leadership and
criminal justice services to federal, state, municipal, and international agencies and part-
ners." FBI, About Us-Quick Facts, http://www.fbi.gov/quickfacts.htm (last visited Feb. 17,
2007). The National Geospatial-Intelligence Agency maintains that it is "[a) Crucial Mem-
20071
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These are, of course, only mission statements or descriptions of
the agencies' general functions and are not the actual "job duties"
of individual employees. However, it would seem highly unusual
for an employee's job duties not to include adhering to the overall
function, goal, or mission of the employer. In this sense, employ-
ees working for the CIA would always have as a job duty uphold-
ing and protecting national security because that is an official
duty of the employer itself, regardless of the individual em-
ployee's actual day-to-day activities.6" If it is an official duty of
the employer to protect the national security of the United States,
is that official duty imputed to the individual employee? Given
the high priority of national security, government agencies, such
as the CIA, could easily impute their agency function onto every
employee.
The Garcetti Court did not define "official duties," offering only
the opinion that an employee's official duties do not merit judicial
supervision:
When an employee speaks as a citizen addressing a matter of public
concern, the First Amendment requires a delicate balancing of the
competing interests surrounding the speech and its consequences.
When, however, the employee is simply performing his or her job du-
ties, there is no warrant for a similar degree of scrutiny. To hold oth-
erwise would be to demand permanent judicial intervention in the
conduct of governmental operations to a degree inconsistent with
sound principles of federalism and the separation of powers.
69
This statement seems to indicate that the Court did not wish to
interfere with an employer's right to define job duties, or with the
employer's right to appropriately discipline employees who dis-
obey proscribed rules. At the same time, the Court claimed that
employees retain First Amendment rights when they speak as
ber of the Intelligence Community," stating that it "provides timely, relevant, and accurate
geospatial intelligence in support of national security objectives." Nat'l Geospatial-
Intelligence Agency, http://www.nga.mil (follow "About NGA" hyperlink; then follow "Fact
Sheets" hyperlink; then follow "The National Geospatial-Intelligence Agency" hyperlink)
(last visited Feb. 17, 2007). As for the NSA, it derives its mission statement from Execu-
tive Order 12,333, and declares, "[t]he Information Assurance mission provides the solu-
tions, products, and services, and conducts defensive information operations, to achieve
information assurance for information infrastructures critical to U.S. national security
interests." NSA, Mission Statement, http://www.nsa.gov/about/about00003.cfm (last vis-
ited Feb. 17, 2007) (citing Exec. Order No. 12,333, 46 Fed. Reg. 59,941 (Dec. 4, 1981)).
68. See supra notes 61-63 and accompanying text.
69. Garcetti v. Ceballos, 126 S. Ct. 1951, 1961 (2006).
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citizens.7" However, the Court never actually defined which state-
ments fall into the protected speech category and which do not.71
Because the majority offered no protection for speech made pur-
suant to an "official duty," without defining that speech, it seems
that if an employer can point to a job description or offer evidence
of official duties, the employee cannot win.
Because the Garcetti decision mandating the new em-
ployee/citizen distinction is relatively recent, it is primarily fed-
eral district courts, and not appellate courts, that have attempted
to interpret whether the speech was made pursuant to a job duty.
These courts have not been consistent in determining what con-
stitutes a "job duty." For example, the Northern District of Ohio
held that Garcetti is to be "narrowly" interpreted, and that "[t]he
preliminary analysis is one of 'job relatedness,"' not whether the
speech was made pursuant to a job duty. 72 That court went on to
explain that if the speech is not required by the employee's job or
related to the required part of the employee's job then the tradi-
tional Pickering analysis still applied. "
In Rohr v. Nehls,74 the Eastern District of Wisconsin instead
looked to the specifics of the speech activity itself. In that case, a
deputy sheriff alleged that he was passed over for a promotion
because he complained to supervisors about the new sheriffs ac-
tions.75 The court refused to grant summary judgment for the
new sheriff, deciding that the deputy sheriffs speech76 was not
barred by Garcetti. 7 7 The court concluded that because the deputy
sheriff failed to go through the appropriate channels in making
his complaint, he acted outside the scope of his employment, thus
70. See id.
71. See id.
72. Pittman v. Cuyahoga Valley Career Ctr., 451 F. Supp. 2d 905, 929 (N.D. Ohio
2006). Pittman involved a full-time substitute teacher who was not re-hired after several
incidents of insubordination, including letting his students out early without approval and
arguing with the principal in the school parking lot. See id. at 910-13. Along with a racial
discrimination claim, Pittman alleged that he was fired because the school disapproved of
his prior written proposals to change the school's parking lot system. Id. at 913-14.
73. Id. at 929-30. The court ruled that Mr. Pittman's speech activity was not a matter
of public concern, as it mainly pertained to his anger at being given additional job duties.
See id. at 930. Thus, Garcetti did not apply.
74. No. 04-C-477, 2006 WL 2927657 (E.D. Wis. Oct. 11, 2006).
75. See id. at *1-2.
76. Specifically, Rohr complained that the new sheriff improperly closed an investiga-
tion into the possession of illegal fireworks. See id. at *2.
77. See id. at *7.
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freeing him from Garcetti's "employee-speech" provisions.78 Ac-
cording to the court, even though Rohr's complaints concerned his
employment, they "were simply not the work product of the sher-
iff s department in the same way Ceballos' memo might have 'be-
longed' to the district attorney's office in Garcetti."79 Because the
deputy sheriff performed a job duty in an unofficial manner, his
speech was that of a citizen and not that of an employee8-an
odd result that seems to hinge on a technicality. However, if this
court had applied the test used in the Ohio case," the result
might have been different. There were procedures in place to
complain about the sheriff, 2 and unofficially reporting problems
in the department could reasonably be related to the job duty of
officially reporting violations.
These two cases, while certainly not the only cases interpreting
Garcetti, demonstrate the difficulty in determining what is a "job
duty" and what is not. However, in the limited time that lower
courts have had to interpret the Garcetti decision, at least some
appear to have done so rather narrowly. For example, in Green v.
Barrett,3 the Northern District of Georgia considered the speech
of a Chief Jailer, who testified in court that her prison was poorly
maintained and "unsafe." 4 The court concluded that she was not
acting pursuant to an official job duty, and that "the Garcetti
holding is limited to the memorandum Ceballos wrote to his su-
periors."85 The court focused on the fact that the speech at issue
was in-court testimony8 6 and seemed to hold that testifying in
court is protected free speech, even though the Chief Jailer spoke
about her official duty of operating the jail. 7 In comparison, the
78. See id.
79. Id.
80. See id.
81. See Pittman v. Cuyahoga Valley Career Ctr., 451 F. Supp. 2d 905, 929 (N.D. Ohio
2006) (finding that Garcetti applies when the employee's job requires the speech in ques-
tion).
82. Rohr, 2006 WL 2927657, at *2.
83. No. 1:04 CV MHS, 2006 WL 2583291 (N.D. Ga. Sept. 8, 2006).
84. See id. at *1. The Chief Jailer gave testimony that prisoners could open locks and
walk around freely, and that she felt high-security prisoners should not be housed at the
facility. See id. She was fired the day after giving testimony in court. See id.
85. Id. at *2.
86. Id.
87. It is worth noting that, although Ceballos was demoted from his job due to his
memorandum, he too spoke out about his job duty in court. Garcetti v. Ceballos, 126 S. Ct.
1951, 1956 (2006).
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deputy sheriffs actions in Rohr were protected because his com-
plaints were not the work product of the department."8
The Middle District of Pennsylvania ruled similarly in a case
involving a police officer who was disciplined after reporting other
officers' conduct.8 9 Specifically, the officer disclosed instances
where an officer attempted to have him falsify a report, an officer
tampered with someone's vehicle, and an officer mishandled a
criminal investigation.90 Although the Pennsylvania State Police
relied heavily on Garcetti9 1 and offered as evidence job descrip-
tions regarding reporting improper conduct, 92 the court decided
that the reporting was protected speech because a private citizen
could have reported all of the claims.93
These examples demonstrate a sampling of the lower courts'
current narrow interpretation of Garcetti: unless the case is
nearly factually identical to Garcetti, they decline to apply the
new "job duty" rule. 94 However, none of the above cases dealt with
national security employees reporting gross mismanagement of a
federal agency.
National security employees cannot rely on the lower courts'
narrow interpretation of Garcetti due to the tendency of these
same courts to broadly protect national security interests. For ex-
ample, an issue currently under scrutiny is the right of the NSA
88. Rohr v. Nehls, No. 04-C-477, 2006 WNL 2927657, at *7 (E.D. Wis. Oct. 11, 2006).
89. Skrutski v. Marut, No. 3:CV-03-2280, 2006 WL 2660691, at *2 (M.D. Pa. Sept. 15,
2006).
90. See id. at *3-4.
91. See id. at *9.
92. Id. at *5-6.
93. Id. at *10.
94. Some district courts, however, have broadly applied the "job duties" limitation on
employee speech. For example, although the Fourth Circuit has only heard a handful of
Garcetti cases, it appears to have taken this approach. In Franklin v. Clark, 454 F. Supp.
2d 356 (D. Md. 2006), the police chief of human resources sued after being terminated for
preparing an analysis on the inefficient use of take home vehicles by police officers. See id.
at 359-60. The court determined that the report, as well as an e-mail discussion about the
fleet report with the deputy mayor, fell within the scope of Garcetti because both were
speech activities made pursuant to an official job duty. See id. at 360-61. In Andrew v.
Clark, Civ. No. AMD 04-3772, 2007 WL 325271 (D. Md. Feb. 5, 2007), a police officer in-
volved in a deadly barricade incident was "deeply disturbed" by the way in which the inci-
dent was handled. See id. at *1. The officer prepared an "internal memorandum" describ-
ing the event in detail, and after the police commissioner failed to respond, released it to
the Baltimore Sun. Id. The court held that Garcetti applied and that the officer could not
transform his speech into protected public speech merely by releasing it to the media. See
id. at *2-3.
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to eavesdrop on individuals suspected of involvement in terrorist
activity.95 The President gave this power to the NSA96 after re-
ceiving congressional authorization "to use all necessary and ap-
propriate force" against "persons he determines planned, author-
ized, committed, or aided the terrorist attacks that occurred on
September 11, 2001, or harbored such organizations or per-
sons."9 7 Although the authorization does not expressly provide for
the warrantless wiretap program, the Department of Justice has
argued that Supreme Court precedent gives substantial authority
to the President when it comes to matters of national security
and that the authorization should therefore be interpreted
broadly.9 Although the wiretap program has recently come under
severe scrutiny, it has existed without judicial interference since
2002, proving the government's ability to successfully assert na-
tional security as a justification for taking away long-held rights,
such as the right to be free from warrantless searches.99 As the
NSA program demonstrates, courts (as well as Congress and the
general public) give more weight to national security interests
than to other governmental interests. For this reason, national
security employees cannot rely on the lower courts' current nar-
row interpretation of Garcetti.
95. See Katherine Wong, Recent Development, The NSA Terrorist Surveillance Pro-
gram, 43 HARV. J. ON LEGIS. 517, 517 (2006) (noting that questions exist as to the validity
of the new NSA program).
96. See id. at 518.
97. Authorization for Use of Military Force, Pub. L. No. 107-40, 115 Stat. 224 (2001).
98. U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, LEGAL AUTHORITIES SUPPORTING THE ACTIVITIES OF THE
NATIONAL SECURITY AGENCY DESCRIBED BY THE PRESIDENT 2 (2006),
http://www.usdoj.gov/opa/whitepaperonnsalegalauthorities.pdf (citing Hamdi v. Rumsfeld,
542 U.S. 507, 536 (2004)).
99. Although the NSA program was authorized in 2002, President Bush is currently
pressing Congress to officially authorize it via a bill, which may not happen given the out-
come of the recent elections. See Eric Litchtblau, The 2006 Elections: With Power Set to Be
Split, Wiretaps Re-emerge as Issue, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 10, 2006, at A28. Courts have already
begun to struggle with the issue of national security as a government interest. In response
to a lawsuit by the ACLU, the Eastern District of Michigan issued a landmark decision
holding the wiretap program unconstitutional. ACLU v. NSA, 438 F. Supp. 2d 754, 782
(E.D. Mich. 2006), appeal docketed, Nos. 06-2095, 06-2140 (6th Cir. Aug. 17, 2006). The
case is currently on appeal to the Sixth Circuit, and the government has successfully ar-
gued for a stay of the district court's order pending the appeal. ACLU v. NSA, 467 F.3d
590, 591 (6th Cir. 2006).
[Vol. 41:759
THE POST-GARCETTI LANDSCAPE
2. Job Duty as an Essential Job Function
Although the Garcetti decision has only recently introduced the
concept of job duties or descriptions to the arena of employee
speech, the area of employment discrimination has some estab-
lished law on the concept. The Americans with Disabilities Act of
1990 ("ADA")100 defines a "qualified individual with a disability"
as:
an individual with a disability who, with or without reasonable ac-
commodation, can perform the essential functions of the employment
position that such individual holds or desires. For the purposes of
this subchapter, consideration shall be given to the employer's judg-
ment as to what functions of a job are essential, and if an employer
has prepared a written description before advertising or interviewing
applicants for the job, this description shall be considered evidence of
the essential functions of the job. 101
Some significant provisions in the statute are worth noting.
First, someone seeking ADA protection must prove, among other
things, that he or she can perform the essential functions of the
position.' 2 In a similar vein, employees seeking First Amend-
ment protection must prove that their speech was not made pur-
suant to an official duty. In both cases, then, employees must rely
on the court's decision regarding job duties as a threshold deter-
mination of whether they will receive statutory or constitutional
protections. In the case of the ADA, the statute states that "con-
sideration shall be given" to the employer's assessment of essen-
tial job functions.' 3 Additionally, the court shall consider as evi-
dence of essential functions any written descriptions of the job. 04
As written, the ADA appears to give considerable deference to the
employer's assessment of essential job functions.
Courts, however, do not always give deference to the em-
ployee's job description. 5 Indeed, an Equal Employment Oppor-
100. 42 U.S.C. §§ 12101-12213 (2000).
101. Id. § 12111(8).
102. See id.
103. Id. (emphasis added).
104. Id.
105. Deane v. Pocono Medical Center, 142 F.3d 138 (3d Cir. 1998), explains the concept
of the essential function. In Deane, the Third Circuit concluded that an employee need
only be able to perform essential job functions, not all job functions. Id. at 146-47. The
employee in Deane was a nurse who could no longer lift patients. Id. at 141. As evidence
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tunity Commission ("EEOC") regulation regarding the implemen-
tation of the ADA offers helpful guidance on how to determine
whether a particular job duty is an "essential job function": "[t]he
term essential functions means the fundamental job duties of the
employment position the individual with a disability holds or de-
sires. The term 'essential functions' does not include the marginal
functions of the position."" 6
In looking at the EEOC's definition of "essential function" in
the context of national security employees and the restriction of
free speech, lower courts should interpret Garcetti as if it said es-
sential duties, rather than simply "duties."' 7 It is critical to note
that the term "job duty" is substantially broader than the ADA's
"essential function." A job duty may include any duties that an
employee performs while an essential job function does not in-
clude marginal duties, but rather, includes only those constitut-
ing the "fundamental job duties of the employment position." 08
As the Garcetti holding did not define job duty,' 9 this more nar-
row definition would prevent national security employers in par-
ticular from firing employees whose specific jobs have nothing to
do with protecting national security.
For example, imagine that part of a secretary's job at the CIA
is to answer the phone for her boss, a high-ranking official with a
security clearance."0 The secretary begins to handle many phone
calls from a suspected leader of a foreign terrorist group, and al-
though she does not know much about her boss's job, she knows
that it should not involve this sort of activity. She is also con-
cerned about his suspicious behavior. The secretary decides to re-
that lifting patients was an essential job function, the Medical Center offered a written job
description, which clearly listed the duties the nurse could no longer perform. See id. at
147-48. The nurse explained that orderlies do the majority of heavy lifting and, addition-
ally, the medical center used a team approach to patient lifting, making it highly unlikely
that she would even need to lift a patient by herself, regardless of her disability. Id. at
147. The court found that there was a genuine issue of material fact as to whether patient
lifting was an essential job function, deciding that "the job description is not, as [the Medi-
cal Center] contends, incontestable evidence that unassisted patient lifting is an essential
function of [the nurse's] job." Id. at 148.
106. 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(n)(1) (2006) (emphasis added).
107. Garcetti v. Ceballos, 126 S. Ct. 1951, 1960 (2006).
108. 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(n)(1) (2006).
109. See Garcetti, 126 S. Ct. at 1961.
110. This example assumes an entry-level secretary with no access to classified docu-
ments and no security clearance. Therefore she performs her daily tasks with no knowl-
edge of any data critical to national security.
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port this activity to the appropriate supervisor within her divi-
sion. The supervisor becomes angry with her for betraying the se-
crets of her boss, and fires her without investigating the situa-
tion. Although reporting such activity was not one of the
secretary's job duties,"' the CIA could argue that it was her duty
to protect the country's national security interests by not reveal-
ing any information to her division supervisor. The CIA's broad
mission would therefore become her specific job duty. If a court
read Garcetti broadly, it could conclude that protecting national
security is one of her job duties, as it is for all CIA employees. 112
If, however, the court adopted an essential job function test, it
could conclude that protecting national security is not an essen-
tial function of this employee. Although the CIA's primary pur-
pose is to protect national security interests, that duty is mar-
ginal to the secretary's specific position within the CIA. Because
protecting national security by reporting the activity of her boss
is not an essential job function, she speaks as a citizen, 1 3 and the
traditional Pickering balancing test would apply." 4
Changing the Garcetti test from "pursuant to an official job
duty" to "pursuant to an essential job function" would help many
national security employees for whom protecting national secu-
rity is a marginal rather than essential job function. As discussed
in Parts III.B and III.C below, many national security employees
are offered little statutory protection if they choose to be a whis-
tleblower."5 Additionally, the agency as a whole, rather than the
individual employee, is exempt from the Whistleblower Protection
Act. 116 Consequently, many employees whose jobs are unrelated
to protecting national security cannot rely on whistleblower stat-
utes if they suddenly discover important information. National
security employees therefore need more First Amendment protec-
tion than Garcetti has provided.
111. Again, assuming any duty to report this behavior is not in her job description.
112. Indeed, the Garcetti Court offered little guidance for determining what is an offi-
cial duty, but held that an employee is not protected if the speech is communicated while
the employee is "simply performing his or her job duties." Garcetti, 126 S. Ct. at 1961.
113. See id. at 1960.
114. See id. at 1958 (citing Pickering v. Bd. of Educ., 391 US. 563, 568 (1968)). See in-
fra Part IV for an analysis of this example under the Pickering test.
115. See infra Part III.B-C.
116. See 5 U.S.C. § 2302(a)(2)(C)(ii), (b)(8) (2000 & Supp. IV 2006).
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There is one problem, however, with the "essential job func-
tion" test: while it prevents the government from universally in-
voking national security as a defense for firing any national secu-
rity employee, it does not prevent the government from firing
people who speak out against legitimate problems. National secu-
rity employees are even more at risk than other public sector em-
ployees because their employers can argue they have a duty to
protect national security in addition to all their other job duties.
For example, suppose an entry-level accountant at the NSA dis-
covers that key officials have mishandled funds. He reports the
error to his immediate supervisor but is told to say nothing fur-
ther. Disregarding this directive, the accountant prepares a
memo detailing his concerns and sends it to the head of his de-
partment. The head of the department criticizes the accountant's
supervisor, who retaliates by firing the accountant. Setting aside
any whistleblower protection the accountant may have, he files
suit in federal court, arguing that his memo was protected speech
under the First Amendment. The government employer, the NSA,
has two possible responses: (1) that one of the accountant's offi-
cial job duties is to prepare such memoranda, and as in Garcetti,
the employer can fire the accountant for the content of his memo;
or (2) in disclosing that key officials at the NSA mishandled
funds, the accountant failed to protect national security, which is
one of his official job duties as an employee of the NSA. If the
court invoked an "essential job function" test, the government
could still argue that preparing memoranda and reporting errors
are essential job functions for accountants. However, the em-
ployer could no longer argue that protecting national security is
an essential job function for an accountant.
Furthermore, those national security employees for whom pro-
tecting national security is an essential job function continue to
pose a problem. The EEOC regulations regarding essential func-
tions in the ADA also note:
(i) The function may be essential because the reason the position ex-
ists is to perform that function;
(ii) The function may be essential because of the limited number of
employees available among whom the performance of that job func-
tion can be distributed; and/or
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(iii) The function may be highly specialized so that the incumbent in
the position is hired for his or her expertise or ability to perform the
particular function. 1
17
Thus, protecting national security is an essential job function of
many national security employees. For example, an Operations
Officer in the CIA's Clandestine Service collects foreign intelli-
gence while living and working undercover at an undisclosed lo-
cation abroad. 118 Therefore, this position exists specifically to pro-
tect national security interests. There are likely a limited number
of these positions available, and the positions are highly special-
ized. As another example, an FBI Special Agent is "responsible
for conducting sensitive national security investigations and for
enforcing over 300 federal statutes."119 A Special Agent's primary
responsibility is protecting national security. For these and many
other national security employees, an essential function test
would not help protect their right to free speech. In sum, al-
though an "essential job function" test would be an improvement
over the current "official job duty" test and would offer more First
Amendment protection to some national security employees, the
test would still leave many national security employees without
adequate First Amendment protection. Therefore, at least with
respect to national security employees, the courts should make an
exception to Garcetti, allowing a return to the traditional
Pickering analysis.
B. The Garcetti Safeguard-The Whistleblower Protection Act
The Garcetti majority offered the existence of statutory protec-
tions as a justification for its denial of First Amendment protec-
tion for public sector employees.120 The Court recognized the need
for employees to expose government inefficiency and misconduct.
Garcetti concluded that, although employees can no longer claim
a First Amendment right to blow the whistle, they can claim a
right to do so under "the powerful network of legislative enact-
ments-such as whistle-blower protection laws and labor codes-
117. 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(n)(2)(i)-(iii) (2006).
118. See CIA, About the Clandestine Community, https://www.cia.gov/careers/clan_
aboutcomm.html (last visited Feb. 17, 2007).
119. FBI, Become an FBI Special Agent, http://www.fbijobs.gov/ll.asp (last visited Feb.
17, 2007).
120. See Garcetti v. Ceballos, 126 S. Ct. 1951, 1962 (2006).
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available to those who seek to expose wrongdoing."121 The Court
then cited a provision from the federal Civil Service Reform Act of
1978 ("CSRA"), as well as two state provisions.122 This federal
provision, § 2302(b)(8), discusses prohibited personnel practices,
and allows an employee to disclose, without retribution, any in-
formation which he "reasonably believes evidences--(i) a violation
of any law, rule, or regulation, or (ii) gross mismanagement, a
gross waste of funds, an abuse of authority, or a substantial and
specific danger to public health or safety." 123 The employee can
disclose such information only if the "disclosure is not specifically
prohibited by law and if such information is not specifically re-
quired by Executive order to be kept secret in the interest of na-
tional defense or the conduct of foreign affairs."' 24 Employees are
also protected when making these disclosures to the Special
Counsel or Inspector General, or another individual designated
by the agency. 
25
This section of the CSRA is part of the Whistleblower Protec-
tion Act of 1989 ("WPA"). The WPA amended the CSRA, adding
additional whistleblower protections.126 At first glance, the WPA
appears to offer substantial protection to all public sector employ-
ees, including those in the national security arena. However, §
2302(a)(2)(C)(ii) defines "agency" so as to expressly exclude the
FBI, "'27 the CIA, the Defense Intelligence Agency, the National
Geospatial-Intelligence Agency, the NSA, and, "as determined by
121. Id.
122. Id. (citing 5 U.S.C. § 2302(b)(8) (2000 & Supp. IV 2006)). This paper is concerned
only with national security employees who work for the federal government and does not
address state statutes that purport to protect state employees working in the arena of na-
tional or state security.
123. 5 U.S.C. § 2302(b)(8)(A)(i)-(ii).
124. Id. § 2302(b)(8)(A).
125. Id. § 2302(b)(8)(B).
126. Whisteblower Protection Act of 1989, Pub. L. No. 101-12, 103 Stat. 16 (1989).
127. Although this section, 5 U.S.C. § 2302(a)(2)(C)(ii), excludes the FBI from the WPA,
another section of the WPA expressly includes the agency. Under § 2303(a), it is a prohib-
ited personnel practice for an employee of the FBI to take or fail to take personnel action
with respect to any other employee of the FBI who discloses information relating to a vio-
lation of law, mismanagement, gross waste of funds, abuse of authority, or a substantial
and specific danger to public health or safety. 5 U.S.C. § 2303(a). The employee can make
this disclosure to the Department of Justice's Office of Professional Responsibility, the
FBI's Office of Professional Responsibility, the Attorney General, the Deputy Attorney
General, the Director of the FBI, or the Deputy Director of the FBI. 28 C.F.R. § 27.1
(2006). In sum, these regulations undo the prohibition in § 2302(a)(2)(C)(ii) by creating
whistleblower protection for FBI employees that is identical to the WPA's protection, with
the only differences being the reporting official and the investigating office.
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the President, any Executive agency or unit thereof the principal
function of which is the conduct of foreign intelligence or counter-
intelligence activities."12 In addition to these specific prohibi-
tions, both §§ 2302(b)(8)(A) and 1213(a)(1) limit the disclosure of
information when the disclosure is prohibited by law or the in-
formation is "specifically required by Executive order to be kept
secret in the interest of national defense or the conduct of foreign
affairs."'29 The WPA, with its prohibitions against the listed
agencies and presidential and legislative power to limit access to
national defense material, essentially offers no protection to
many national security employees.' 30
National security employees who work for an agency such as
the DHS, which is not explicitly excluded from WPA's protection
under the agency definition in § 2302(a)(2)(C)(ii), still face a pre-
carious situation even though they may currently enjoy WPA pro-
tection. Section 2302(a)(2)(C)(ii) allows the President to exempt
from the WPA's protections "any Executive agency or unit thereof
the principal function of which is the conduct of foreign intelli-
gence or counterintelligence activities."' 3 ' For example, even
though the DHS is currently an "unlisted" executive agency,' 32 as
long as one could argue its principal function is the conduct of
foreign intelligence or counterintelligence activities, the President
could mandate the DHS's exemption from the WPA. 133 If the
128. 5 U.S.C. § 2302(a)(2)(C)(ii). The WPA also exempts the General Accounting Office.
Id. § 2302(a)(2)(C)(iii). However, for a non-listed agency to be exempted from the WPA un-
der § 2302(a)(2)(C)(ii), the President or his "lawful delegate" must specifically exempt the
agency; the Merit Systems Protection Board, which handles whistleblower cases, cannot
make such a determination absent this specific exemption by the President. See Czar-
kowski v. Merit Sys. Prot. Bd., 390 F.3d 1347, 1350 (Fed. Cir. 2004).
129. 5 U.S.C. § 2302(b)(8)(A); id. § 1213(a)(1).
130. In addition, the government has made frequent use of the almost identical provi-
sion in the Freedom of Information Act ("FOIA") that excludes national defense informa-
tion from public disclosure. See id. § 552(b)(1). See, for example, Edmonds v. FBI, 272 F.
Supp. 2d 35 (D.D.C. 2003), in which a former FBI employee sued the FBI under the FOIA,
seeking documents relating to the whistleblowing activities that led to her termination. Id.
at 42. The court held that the vast majority of the documents she requested were properly
withheld from her under FOIA's national security exemptions, deferring to the govern-
ment's claimed national security interests. See id. at 45-47. The use of FOIA to further
limit the speech and whistleblowing activities of national security employees, while inter-
esting, is beyond the scope of this paper.
131. 5 U.S.C. § 2302(a)(2)(C)(ii).
132. See id. § 105 ("'Executive agency' means an Executive department, a Government
corporation, and an independent establishment.").
133. The President or his agent must specifically mandate that an unlisted agency is
exempt from the WPA. See Czarkowski, 390 F.3d at 1350. It is not clear how one deter-
mines whether conducting intelligence or counterintelligence activities is the principal
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President were to take this action,1 4 DHS employees would find
themselves suddenly unprotected by the WPA.
National security employees currently protected by the WPA
fear more than the chance of being declared exempt by the Presi-
dent; they face the additional hurdle of §§ 2302(b)(8)(A) and
1213(a)(1), which preclude whistleblower protections for disclo-
sure of certain protected material if a statute or Executive Order
has specifically prohibited disclosure of the material in the inter-
est of national security. 135 Of course, not even Pickering will save
employees who wish to reveal documents and materials that are
clearly protected in the interest of national security. The First
Amendment should not go so far as to allow employees to reveal
security secrets that are critical to the government's interests.
However, national security should not be used as a weapon to
prevent employees from speaking out about matters traditionally
protected by the First Amendment and whistleblower statutes,
such as fraud, mismanagement, abuse of authority, and threats
to the public safety.
C. The Garcetti Solution? The Intelligence Community
Whistleblower Protection Act
There is another, less-known, federal whistleblower statute de-
signed to fill the gaps left by the WPA. After much debate, the In-
function of an agency. However, the DHS states that its mission is to protect the United
States from terrorist attacks-a function that surely involves many intelligence and coun-
terintelligence activities. U.S. DEP'T OF HOMELAND SEC., SECURING OUR HOMELAND: U.S.
DEPARTMENT OF HOMELAND SECURITY STRATEGIC PLAN 4 (2004), available at http://www.
dhs.gov/xlibrary/assets/DHS-StratPlan-FINAL-spread.pdf.
134. However, in this example, the President would have to face a statutory rule sug-
gesting that employees of the DHS are to have protection under the WPA. Section 9701
requires any human resources system set up by the DHS to respect the provisions regard-
ing "protection of employees against reprisal for whistleblowing" as well as "any provision
of section 2302, relating to prohibited personnel practices." 5 U.S.C. § 9701(b)(3)(A)-(B)
(Supp. IV 2006). The fact that the President has the authority to specifically exempt a na-
tional security agency under § 2302(a)(2)(C)(ii) while § 9701 mandates that employees of
the DHS have § 2302 protection appears at first glance to be a statutory inconsistency.
However, the mandate in § 9701 merely states that any human resources system set up by
the DHS must "not waive, modify, or otherwise affect-(A) the public employment princi-
ples ... set forth in section 2301 ... [or] (B) any provision of section 2302." Id. Thus, if the
President exempted the DHS under § 2302, a human resources department set up by the
agency would not be waiving a right to whistleblower protection because such a right
would no longer exist. This issue has not been addressed by any court.
135. See id. § 2302(b)(8)(A) (2000 & Supp. IV 2006); id. § 1213(a)(1) (2000).
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telligence Community Whistleblower Protection Act of 1998
("ICWPA") was passed as part of the Intelligence Authorization
Act for Fiscal Year 1999.136 The ICWPA essentially provides lim-
ited whistleblower protection to agencies specifically excluded
from the broader WPA. It states:
An employee of the Defense Intelligence Agency, the National Geo-
spatial-Intelligence Agency, the National Reconnaissance Office, or
the National Security Agency ... who intends to report to Congress
a complaint or information with respect to an urgent concern may
report the complaint or information to the Inspector General of the
Department of Defense (or designee). 137
The ICWPA also allows employees of the FBI to report to the
Inspector General of the Department of Justice.13 The Act mir-
rors the WPA in that it allows any employee of an agency "deter-
mined by the President under section 2302(a)(2)(C)(ii) ... to have
as its principal function the conduct of foreign intelligence or
counterintelligence activities" to report urgent concerns to the
appropriate Inspector General.139 The Inspectors General have a
limited amount of time to act on any complaint received. 40 If an
Inspector General finds the information not credible or otherwise
fails to report the information to the appropriate intelligence
committee heads, the employee "may submit the complaint or in-
formation to Congress by contacting either or both of the intelli-
gence committees directly.""'
136. Pub. L. No. 105-272, 112 Stat. 2413 (1998). See Thomas Newcomb, In from the
Cold: The Intelligence Community Whistleblower Protection Act of 1998, 53 ADMIN. L. REV.
1235 (2001), for a detailed account of the legislative history of the ICWPA.
137. 5 U.S.C. app. § 8H(a)(1)(A) (2000 & Supp. IV 2006).
138. Id. app. § 8H(a)(1)(B).
139. Id. app. § 8H(a)(1)(C). Additionally, "[t]he ICWPA further supports the clear in-
tent of Congress that a determination made pursuant to section 2302(a)(2)(C)(ii) by the
President, or his delegate, must be explicit in order to give exempted employees an oppor-
tunity to participate in the alternate whistleblowing scheme provided for exempted intelli-
gence employees." Czarkowski v. Merit Sys. Prot. Bd., 390 F.3d 1347, 1351 (Fed. Cir.
2004). Thus, as previously discussed, some national security employees who currently en-
joy the WPA's protection could have that protection removed by the President at any time,
at which point they would have to turn to the much weaker ICWPA for whistleblower pro-
tection.
140. See 5 U.S.C. app. § 8H(a)(2)(b).
141. Id. app. § 8H(d)(1). However, the employee can only contact the intelligence com-
mittees directly if he first furnishes to the head of his agency a statement of his complaint
and obtains from the Inspector General directions on how to contact the intelligence com-
mittees according to established security practices. Id. app. § 8H(d)(2)(A)-(B).
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An employee covered by the ICWPA may only contact the In-
spector General and Congress if it is a matter of "urgent con-
cern."14 The term "urgent concern" is defined as:
(A) A serious or flagrant problem, abuse, violation of law or Execu-
tive order, or deficiency relating to the funding, administration, or
operations of an intelligence activity involving classified information,
but [not including] differences of opinions concerning public policy
matters.
(B) A false statement to Congress, or a willful withholding from Con-
gress, on an issue of material fact relating to the funding, admini-
stration, or operation of an intelligence activity.
(C) An action, including a personnel action described in section
2302(a)(2)(A) of title 5, constituting reprisal or threat of reprisal pro-
hibited under section 7(c) in response to an employee's reporting an
urgent concern in accordance with this section.
It is immediately evident that the ICWPA and the WPA differ
substantially in their protections. The WPA allows employees to
report matters concerning mismanagement, waste of funds, abuse
of authority, substantial dangers to public health and safety, and
violations of law without fear of reprisal.1" By contrast, the
ICWPA only addresses "urgent concerns." 14' The ICWPA essen-
tially serves as a mechanism for the Inspectors General and intel-
ligence committees to bring urgent concerns before Congress in
an indirect manner. 146 However, what about concerns that do not
rise to the level of "urgent"? Although the purpose of the ICWPA
is to bring problems to Congress,147 Congress specifically limited
the scope of the Act to "urgent concerns," excluding an array of is-
sues covered by the much broader WPA. For example, although
the ICWPA covers employees who wish to report "flagrant prob-
lem[s] ... relating to the funding" of an agency, 14 language that
sounds similar to the WPA's "gross waste of funds,"14 ' employees
142. Id. app. § 8H(a)(1)(A)-(C).
143. Id. app. § 8H(h)(1).
144. Id. § 2302(b)(8)(A)-(B) (2000 & Supp. IV 2006).
145. Id. app. § 8H(h)(1).
146. See Newcomb, supra note 136, at 1267.
147. "Congress, as a co-equal branch of Government, is empowered by the Constitution
to serve as a check on the executive branch; in that capacity, it has a 'need to know' of al-
legations of wrongdoing within the executive branch, including allegations of wrongdoing
in the Intelligence Community." Pub. L. No. 105-272, 112 Stat. 2396, 2413 (1998).
148. 5 U.S.C. app. § 8H(h)(1)(A).
149. Id. § 2302(b)(8)(B)(ii).
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covered by the ICWPA can only report flagrant funding problems
that relate to an "intelligence activity" and involve "classified in-
formation." 5 ° This limitation gives rise to two questions. First,
what if the problem does not involve "funding" but instead in-
volves a superior's "waste" of funds? Second, what constitutes a
flagrant problem involving classified information? What if the
concern is flagrant and involves funding, but does not involve
classified information? Does the ICWPA then not apply?
Although this is only one example, it illustrates the fundamen-
tal problem with the current federal whistleblower laws as they
pertain to the majority of national security employees: there is
simply too much gray area. Initially, which statute applies to the
employee, the WPA or the ICWPA? Although some agencies em-
ployees are specifically exempted from the WPA and must rely on
the weaker ICWPA for protection, others currently fall into a
"holding pattern"; due to the nature of their jobs they enjoy pro-
tected status only at the whim of the President.' For those who
are specifically exempted from the WPA-employees of the CIA,
the Defense Intelligence Agency, the National Geospatial-
Intelligence Agency, and the NSA-some, but not all, are offered
limited protection under the ICWPA. Of these, the ICWPA offers
specific protection only to employees of the Defense Intelligence
Agency, the National Geospatial-Intelligence Agency, the Na-
tional Reconnaissance Office, and the NSA. 15 2
After determining which statute applies to a national security
employee, what type of whistleblowing activity may he or she en-
gage in? If the employee is protected only by the ICWPA, his or
her disclosures are limited to matters of "urgent concern"-
essentially, matters serious enough to warrant congressional
hearings. On the other hand, if the employee falls under the
WPA, his or her protection from speech-related retaliation is con-
siderably broader.
150. Id. app. § 8H(h)(1)(A).
151. See id. § 2302(a)(2)(C)(ii). See also supra text accompanying notes 126-33.
152. 5 U.S.C. app. § 8H(a)(1)(A). Oddly enough, although FBI employees are afforded
special protections under the WPA, they are allowed some protections under the ICWPA
as well. See id. app. § 8H(a)(1)(B). As for the CIA, although it is not listed in 5 U.S.C. app.
§ 8H(a)(1)(A), its employees do receive some whistleblower protection under the ICWPA.
The Central Intelligence Agency Act was amended to allow CIA employees to report di-
rectly to the CIA Inspector General flagrant problems that they would ordinarily report to
Congress. 50 U.S.C. § 403q(d)(5)(A) (2000).
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D. A New Possibility-The Executive Branch Reform Act
Certain members of Congress have recognized the gap left by
the current state of whistleblower statutes. In April 2006, Repre-
sentative Thomas Davis introduced House Bill 5112, the Execu-
tive Branch Reform Act of 2006 ("Reform Act").153 The whistle-
blower provisions in the Reform Act essentially fill the gaps left
by the ICWPA and mirror the WPA with regard to national secu-
rity employees. In addition to rights provided in § 2303, under the
Reform Act national security employees would also be protected
from having their security clearances revoked as a result of re-
porting "a violation of any law, rule, or regulation, or . . . gross
mismanagement, a gross waste of funds, an abuse of authority, or
a substantial and specific danger to public health or safety."1
54
Covered agencies include the CIA, the FBI, the Defense Intelli-
gence Agency, the National Geospatial-Intelligence Agency, the
NSA, and the National Reconnaissance Office.' 55 Under this stat-
ute employees would report their concerns to their agency's In-
spector General. 15 6 In remarking on the need for this legislation
following the Garcetti decision, Representative Davis stated:
Whistleblowers often play an important role in exposing government
misconduct.... From a practical standpoint, the decision and the re-
porting that followed the decision may give whistleblowers the im-
pression that they're better off just taking their problems to the
press. Some people might be okay with that, but the real goal should
be the creation of a workplace environment where employees feel
free to discuss waste, fraud, and abuse with employers, and employ-
ers feel more comfortable fixing the problem than covering it up. We
need better government, not more headlines. 1
57
153. Executive Branch Reform Act of 2006, H.R. 5112, 109th Cong. (2006), available at
http://www.fas.org/sgp/congress/2006/hr5112.pdf.
154. Id. § 8(a), (e)(1).
155. Id. § 8(e)(2).
156. Id. § 8(b).
157. What Price Free Speech: Whistleblowers and the Ceballos Decision: Hearing Before
the H. Comm. on Gov't Reform, 109th Cong. (2006) (statement of Rep. Thomas Davis,
Chairman, H. Comm. on Gov't Reform). Although the Reform Act is seen as an attempt to
fill in the gaps left by other whistleblower statutes, and gives much-needed protection to
national security employees, it faces an uphill battle. In the fall of 2005, the House Gov-
ernment Reform Committee rejected a measure that would have provided stronger protec-
tion for national security whistleblowers. See Chris Strohm, Security Agency Whistleblow-
ers Seek Stronger Protections, Feb. 14, 2006, http://www.govexec.com/dailyfed/0206/021
406cl.htm.
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Although the Reform Act would offer substantial whistleblower
protection to the listed agencies, it does not solve the problem of
agencies that are currently locked in § 2302(a)(2)(C)(ii)'s "holding
pattern."'58 These agencies are not specifically exempted by the
WPA, but could be added to the WPA's list of exempted agencies
at the President's discretion.' 59 In an age of uncertainty, where
terrorism is a constant threat and even news reporters face im-
prisonment for failing to reveal sources,160 it is not hard to imag-
ine a situation where a President invokes his statutory power un-
der § 2302(a)(2)(C)(ii) to exempt particular agencies from whistle-
blower protection. If this occurs, the statutory safety net envi-
sioned by the Garcetti Court disappears for national security em-
ployees. Although the Court attempted to justify its denial of
First Amendment freedoms owing to existing statutory protec-
tions, "'[t]he applicability of a provision of the Constitution has
never depended on the vagaries of state or federal law."""' Justice
Souter also noted the impropriety of relying on variable statutes
to protect the First Amendment right to free speech:
"[ilndividuals doing the same sorts of governmental jobs and say-
ing the same sorts of things addressed to civic concerns will get
different protection depending on the local, state, or federal juris-
dictions that happened to employ them."'62 Additionally, research
has demonstrated that national security whistleblowers "operate
within a system of mixed messages," caught in the midst of a
power struggle between Congress and the Executive Branch. 6 '
158. See supra text accompanying notes 130-33.
159. See 5 U.S.C. § 2302(a)(2)(C)(ii) (2000 & Supp. IV 2006).
160. See, e.g., Eric Schmitt, Senator Calls for Inquiry into Journalists' Access, N.Y.
TIMES, Oct. 16, 2005, at A23 (discussing the sensational case of Judith Miller, a New York
Times reporter who was imprisoned for eighty-five days for refusing to identify a confiden-
tial source).
161. Garcetti v. Ceballos, 126 S. Ct. 1951, 1970 (2006) (Souter, J., dissenting) (quoting
Bd. of County Comm'rs v. Umbehr, 518 U.S. 668, 680 (1996)).
162. Id. at 1971 (Souter, J., dissenting).
163. See LOUIS FISHER, CONG. RES. SERV., CRS REPORT FOR CONGRESS: NATIONAL
SECURITY WHISTLEBLOWERS 1-2 (2005), available at http://www.pogo.org/m/gp/gp-crs-nsw-
12302005.pdf. The CRS report describes multiple whistleblower protection options avail-
able to national security employees, including the ICWPA and the WPA, as well as other,
lesser-known options not discussed in this paper. The report suggests that the battle be-
tween Congress's need for critical information and the President's desire for silence has
hindered the development of whistleblower laws: "Congress has never accepted the theory
that the President has exclusive, ultimate, and unimpeded authority over the collection,
retention, and dissemination of national security information." Id. at 41. See also Chris
Strohm, Report Finds Government Whistleblowers Lack Adequate Protections, Jan. 10,
2006, http:// www.govexec.com/dailyfed/0106/011006cl.htm.
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As a whole, forcing employees who blow the whistle on matters of
public concern to rely on limited and inconsistent statutes for pro-
tection against reprisal makes little sense. The Pickering test
would instead provide more flexibility while still preserving the
government's legitimate interest of protecting critical informa-
tion.
IV. A RETURN TO PICKERING
Although the majority found reasons to create a distinction be-
tween employee speech and citizen speech, Justice Souter could
not, stating:
Indeed, the very idea of categorically separating the citizen's interest
from the employee's interest ignores the fact that the ranks of public
service include those who share the poet's "object . . .to unite [m]y
avocation and my vocation;" these citizen servants are the ones
whose civic interest rises highest when they speak pursuant to their
duties, and these are exactly the ones government employers most
want to attract. There is no question that public employees speaking
on matters they are obliged to address would generally place a high
value on a right to speak, as any responsible citizen would. 164
For this very reason, the courts should return to the Pickering
balancing test, at least (or perhaps especially) with respect to na-
tional security employees. Under Pickering, the government em-
ployer does not lack a voice; indeed, the government maintains a
substantial legitimate interest in maintaining its own workplace.
[Tihe government, as an employer, must have wide discretion and
control over the management of its personnel and internal affairs.
This includes the prerogative to remove employees whose conduct
hinders efficient operation and to do so with dispatch. Prolonged re-
tention of a disruptive or otherwise unsatisfactory employee can ad-
versely affect discipline and morale in the work place, foster dishar-
mony, and ultimately impair the efficiency of an office or agency. 165
The Pickering test sufficiently protects government interests,
whereas the Garcetti modifications virtually destroy any chance
164. Garcetti, 126 S. Ct. at 1966 (Souter, J., dissenting) (alterations in original) (quot-
ing ROBERT FROST, Two Tramps in Mud Time, in COLLECTED POEMS, PROSE, AND PLAYS
251, 252 (Richard Poirier & Mark Richardson eds., 1995)).
165. Arnett v. Kennedy, 416 U.S. 134, 168 (1974) (Powell, J., concurring in part).
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of a national security employee seeking First Amendment protec-
tions, with no appreciable gain in government protection. It
makes little sense to strengthen a "balancing" test in favor of one
side when it is intended to balance two equal, but competing, in-
terests. The Garcetti Court first allowed the government em-
ployer to argue that the employee's official job duty is to protect
national security. 166 If the employee can prove that protecting na-
tional security is not his or her job duty, the government em-
ployer may argue that the employee's speech should still not be
protected due to national security interests if the employer can
demonstrate under Pickering that the speech is a detriment to
the government agency's interests.'67 The government is essen-
tially permitted to make the same argument twice. This is pre-
cisely what Justice Brennan argued against in his dissenting
opinion in Connick.'6' There he stated that the Court's holding
improperly weighed one factor, the context in which the speech
was made, twice-first in determining whether the speech was a
matter of public concern, and again in weighing the government's
interest.'69 Although Justice Brennan agreed that the context of
the speech was relevant in assessing the government's interests
as an employer, he felt that it should not also be considered when
deciding whether the speech was a matter of public concern. 70 In
an identical situation, the Garcetti Court indicated (with respect
to national security employees) that the issue of national security
should be weighed twice. Just as the context of the speech is rele-
vant to the government's interest, the national security argument
is relevant to the government's interest-it is the government's
interest. However, whether someone works for a national security
agency should not be the determining factor in whether he or she
is protected by Pickering. Unfortunately, the current job duty test
creates just that situation for national security employees. As
Justice Souter pointed out, the employee who finds a problem
while doing his or her job is often in the best position to report the
problem and correct it.' 7 ' In the national security context, where
significant problems could mean the difference between life and
166. See Garcetti, 126 S. Ct. at 1960.
167. See Pickering v. Bd. of Educ., 391 U.S. 563, 568 (1968).
168. See Connick v. Myers, 461 U.S. 138, 157-59 (1983) (Brennan, J., dissenting).
169. See id. at 157-58 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
170. See id. at 159 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
171. See Garcetti, 126 S. Ct. at 1966 (Souter, J., dissenting).
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death, employees should arguably be rewarded for addressing
these problems. Instead, as a result of Garcetti, employees are
punished for any speech made pursuant to an official job duty. As
the Pickering test already filters out speech that may harm the
agency (such as someone attempting to reveal critical security se-
crets because she is angry at her manager), the additional filter-
ing of any speech pursuant to an official job duty is unnecessary.
The Pickering test protects employee speech that did not harm
the agency. Reexamining the aforementioned scenario of the sec-
retary working for the CIA, the Pickering test becomes very ap-
pealing for national security employees. As demonstrated above,
the employee faces a loss under Garcetti because the CIA can ar-
gue that her official duty is to protect national security. However,
under Pickering, she would win. Because she fears her boss may
harm the country, her speech is a matter of public concern. As-
suming she reported the concern internally to an appropriate offi-
cial, the CIA was not disrupted nor harmed by her disclosure. Of
course, if she told everyone in the office that her boss was a spy,
or gave this information to another country's intelligence officers,
then obviously the government would be harmed and her speech
should not be protected. This demonstrates that Garcetti substan-
tially limited the ability of national security employees to speak
about matters of public concern, whereas the Pickering test would
still work in the national security context.
Public sector employees simply cannot rely on whistleblower
statutes to save them. From 1999 to 2005, only two out of thirty
whistleblower claims prevailed before the Merit Systems Protec-
tion Board; from 1995 to 2005, only one out of ninety-six claims
prevailed before the Federal Circuit. 172 National security employ-
ees also face the unique punishment of having their security
clearances reyoked if they speak out against wrongdoing. 17 3 With-
out a security clearance, national security employees cannot
work. In light of these repercussions, without a return to
172. FISHER, supra note 163, at 21 (citing Project on Government Oversight, Homeland
and National Security Whistleblower Protections: The Unfinished Agenda, April 28, 2005,
at 8, available at http://www.pogo.org/mgp/wbr2005/WBR-04282005.pdf).
173. See Project on Government Oversight, Homeland and National Security Whistle-
blower Protections: The Unfinished Agenda, April 28, 2005, at 11, available at http://www.
pogo.org/m/gp/wbr2005/WBR-04282005.pdf. The Executive Branch Reform Act's removal
of this particular punishment is another point in the Act's favor. H.R. 5112, 109th Cong. §
8(a) (2006).
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Pickering, national security employees may never speak up when
an issue arises, even when they ideally should speak up.
V. CONCLUSION
The unclear nature of the whistleblower statutes and the Gar-
cetti Court's uncertain definition of "job duty"174 have the poten-
tial to create a chilling effect on the speech of national security
employees who wish to disclose important information. First, na-
tional security employees have reason to fear that their agency's
duty to protect national security will be imputed to them as their
official job duty, regardless of their daily tasks.' Second, the lim-
ited nature of the federal whistleblower statutes leaves national
security employees with little statutory protection.
In June 2006, Richard Ceballos testified before the House
Committee on Government Reform as to his views on the Garcetti
decision."17 His statements poignantly illustrate why the Garcetti
modifications to the Pickering test should be rejected, and why a
return should be made to the traditional Pickering test, especially
with respect to national security employees:
This ruling creates a predicament for government employees
who in the future witness corruption, fraud, waste, or mismanage-
ment in the workplace: either disclose their observations internally
by following proper procedure and run the risk that their reports will
be met by hostile and unsympathetic supervisors in which case they
will not be protected by the First Amendment, or, alternatively, hold
a press conference on the front steps of the government building and
publicly embarrass government officials to assure themselves First
Amendment protection. Being placed in this predicament is as illogi-
cal as it is bizarre.
Actually, employees will have another choice, one that public
employees are more likely to follow than the two options above: Keep
quiet and say nothing. Most employees will simply look the other
way and feign ignorance of corruption, waste, fraud, or mismanage-
ment that they witness in their workplace.
174. See supra Part III.A.
175. See supra Part III.A.
176. Whistleblowers and Free Speech: Hearing Before the H. Comm. on Gov't Reform,
109th Cong. (2006) (statement of Richard Ceballos, Deputy District Attorney of Los Ange-
les County).
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And, if this occurs, not only public employees will have lost. More
importantly, the public will have lost. The people will have lost their
right to know what is happening in their own government; their
right to know what their elected and non-elected public officials are
doing in government; their right to know if their taxpayer money is
being spent properly or being wasted; and their right to know if their
public officials are engaged in corrupted or fraudulent conduct. 1
77
Jamie Sasser
177. Id.
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